Chief Justice Moon's Criminal Past by Wallsgrove, Richard
Chief Justice Moon's Criminal Past 
Kamaile Nichols and Richard Wallsgrove* 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 755 
II. SELECT DECISIONS ON EVIDENCE LAW IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT ............ 756 
A. Background-Chief Justice Moon and the Hawai 'i Rules of Evidence756 
B. Case Summaries ................................................................................... 758 
1. Fetelee-The codified rules of evidence replace the long-accepted 
common law res gestae exception ............... ..................................... 758 
2. Manewa-Strict foundational requirements for evidence concerning 
analyses of illegal drugs .................................................................. 760 
3. Assaye, Werle, and Fitzwater-Evidentiary requirements in the 
driving cases .................................................................................... 763 
C. Trends and Other Comments on the Evidence Cases ........................... 767 
III. SELECT DECISIONS IMPLICATING PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THE CRIMINAL 
CONTEXT ..................................................................................................... 770 
A. Background .......................................................................................... 770 
B. Case Summaries ................................................................................... 772 
1. Keams and Trainor-"Walk and talk" after Quino ......................... 772 
2. Lopez and Cuntapay-Privacy in the home ..................................... 773 
3. Heapy, Spillner, and Estabillio-Privacy on the road. .................... 774 
4. Jane Doe and John Doe-Privacy at school .................................... 776 
C. Trends and Other Comments on the Privacy Cases ............................. 776 
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 778 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cheeky title aside, this article does not allege that Ronald Moon, Chief 
Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court from 1993 to 2010, has a secret criminal 
past. Instead, as the curtain closes on Chief Justice Moon's tenure at the helm 
of Hawai'i's judiciary, this article examines portions of the Moon Court's 
jurisprudence by selecting and reviewing several decisions in the context of 
criminal law. We also aim to contribute to the University of Hawai'i Law 
Review's historical dialogue regarding the Hawai'i Supreme Court's trends and 
legacies. This special journal issue follows in the footsteps of earlier articles 
such as 1992's The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai'i's 
Constitution, which examined various issues decided by the Hawai'i Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Herman Lum. 1 
• William S. Richardson School of Law, J.D. 2008. As former Co-Editors-in-Chief of the 
University of Hawai'i Law Review, we are delighted to take part in this special journal issue. 
1 Jon M. Van Dyke et aI., The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai'i's 
Constitution, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 311 (1992); see also, e.g., Marcus L. Kawatachi, Comment, 
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With those goals, this article examines the Moon Court through the lens of 
two specific issues.2 First, we review select decisions on evidentiary issues in 
criminal law cases. This discussion is framed by the fact that Moon sat as chief 
justice for more than half the present lifetime of the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence, 
which were codified in 1980. Recent decisions on the effect of that 
codification (e.g., State v. Feteiee\ and on elementary foundational 
requirements (e.g., State v. Manewa4), illustrate a strict approach to evidentiary 
issues in the criminal law context. 
Second, we highlight select criminal law decisions that implicate privacy 
concerns. Focusing on search and seizure rulings in various contexts, we 
review a general trend of increasingly broad privacy protections under Hawai' i 
law and the correspondingly stringent "reasonable suspicion" requirements 
imposed on state law enforcement officers. . 
F or each issue, we present a brief introduction to the state of affairs prior to 
Moon's appointment as chief justice. We then describe various related cases 
and their holdings. Finally, we conclude the discussion on each issue by 
identifying trends and other insights illuminated by the Moon Court decisions. 
The cases described in this article paint a picture of the Moon Court as 
unrepentantly requiring prosecutors to adhere to limitations and rules in the 
criminal context. It is no surprise that along Hawai'i's long and tangled 
grapevine of law clerks and other young lawyers, Chief Justice Moon 
developed a reputation as a friendly stickler for the rules. 
II. SELECT DECISIONS ON EVIDENCE LAW IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 
A. Background-Chief Justice Moon and the Hawai 'i Rules of Evidence 
Although the bulk of his private career was spent practicing in the civil 
context, Chief Justice Moon's first job was as a Deputy Prosecutor for the City 
and County of Honolulu, from 1966 to 1968.5 Moon was appointed to sit on 
Hawai'i's First Circuit Court in 1980.6 
Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992,18 U. HAw. L. REv. 683 
(1996) (examining early decisions by the Moon Court). 
2 For a broader "sampling of the landmark cases of the Moon Court," see Susan Pang 
Gochros, Aloha, Chief Justice Moon, HAw. BJ., Sept. 2010, at 4. 
3 117 Haw. 53, 175 P.3d 709 (2008). 
4 115 Haw. 343, 167 P.3d 336 (2007). 
5 This was Chief Justice Moon's first legal job after clerking for United States District 
Court Judge Martin Pence. See Hon. Ronald T.Y. Moon, Profile, available at 
https:llweb2.westlaw.comlwelcome (follow "Profiler-Professional" link to "Ronald T.Y. 
Moon") (copy on file with authors); see also Gochros, supra note 2, at 4. 
6 See Hon. Ronald T.Y. Moon, Profile, supra note 5. 
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That same year, during the term of Chief Justice William Richardson, the 
Hawai'i Legislature adopted the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (the H.R.E.) as 
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (H.R.S.) chapter 626.7 According to Addison 
Bowman, Emeritus Professor at the University of Hawai'i William S. 
Richardson School of Law (and author of the often-cited Hawaii Rules of 
Evidence Manual), the Hawai'i Supreme Court "could have unilaterally 
adopted the rules pursuant to its constitutional prerogative to fashion and 
enforce rules of practice and procedure.,,8 Instead, "the supreme court chose to 
share this initiative with its sibling branch, recognizing that the legislature has 
some legitimate interest in evidence law, and harking back to the 1975 
enactment of the Federal Rules ofEvidence.,,9 
In 1993, the same year that Moon was appointed chief justice, the Hawai' i 
Supreme Court continued this "shared initiative" tack. The court formed the 
Standing Committee on the Rules of Evidence and charged it with the mandate 
"to study and evaluate proposed evidence law measures referred by the Hawaii 
Legislature, and to consider and propose appropriate amendments to the Hawaii 
Rules of Evidence.,,10 In Professor Bowman's view, the past "quarter century 
of committee oversight, legislative refinement, and appellate court application 
is a well integrated set of evidence rules that embody some of the best thinking 
in American evidence law."ll 
The Moon Court's seventeen-year history, spanning more than half the 
present lifetime of the H.R.E., thus played a fundamental role in setting 
Hawai'i's law on evidence on its course. 
7 See, e.g., Fetelee, 117 Haw. at 63 n.9, 175 P.3d at 719 n.9 ("The Hawai'i Rules of 
Evidence were codified in 1981. See 1980 Haw. Sess. L. Act 164, § 19 at 274 ('This Action 
shall take effect on January 1, 1981. '). "). 
8 ADDISONM. BOWMAN, HAWAII RULES OF EVlDENCE MANUAL vii (2010-201 1 ed.). Note 
that even the Moon Court relied upon Professor Bowman's evidence manual. See, e.g., State v. 
Fitzwater, 122 Haw. 354,365,227 P.3d 520, 531 (2010) (quoting the "HRE Manual § 803-
3[5][B]"). 
9 BOWMAN, supra note 8, at vii; see also Addison M. Bowman, The Hawaii Rules of 
Evidence, 2 U. HAw. L. REv. 431 (1981) (describing the early history ofthe H.R.E. adoption). 
IO BOWMAN, supra note 8, at viii. 
II Id. 
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B. Case Summaries 
1. Fetelee-As a "singular and primary source" for the rules of evidence, 
the codified rules replace the long-accepted common law res gestae 
exception 
Hawai'i's mere adoption of formal rules of evidence did not answer the 
question of how such rules should be applied. This question is complicated 
when one recognizes that prior decisions on evidentiary issues, under the 
common law, might---or might not-be applicable under the codified H.R.E. 
In a 2008 opinion written by Chief Justice Moon, State v. Fetelee,12 the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court tackled one aspect of this thorny question, in the 
context of criminal law. 
Following a jury trial, defendant Faa Fetelee was convicted of attempted 
murder, attempted assault, and theft. 13 The theft charge stemmed from 
Fetelee's confrontation with a woman in the parking lot of his apartment 
building. 14 He was accused of stealing ten dollars from the woman, but he 
testified that he merely asked the woman for a cigarette and did not take the 
money. 15 
The attempted murder and attempted assault charges stemmed from a 
confrontation with two men walking on the street fronting Fetelee's apartment 
building.16 Fetelee was accused of stabbing one of the men and kicking the 
other in the face. 17 Fetelee testified that he was merely defending himself. 18 
Both of these incidents were preceded by an incident involving F etelee inside 
an apartment in the complex (the "apartment incident,,).19 Fetelee and 
prosecution witnesses testified that he entered the apartment in an agitated and 
intoxicated state and caused a fan to hit the ceiling.20 Prosecution witnesses 
testified that Fetelee then attacked and chased two men in the apartment.21 The 
12 117 Haw. 53, 175 P.3d 709. 
13 See id. at 55, 175 P.3d at 71l. 
14 See id. 
IS See id. at 56-58,175 P.3d at 712-14. 
16 See id. at 55, 175 P.3d at 71l. 
17 See id. at 57, 175 P.3d at 713. 
18 See id. at 58-59, 175 P.3d at 714-15. 
19 See id. at 55, 175 P.3d at 71l. 
20 See id. at 56, 58,175 P.3d at 712,714. 
21 See id. at 56, 175 P.3d at 712. Fetelee "testified that he was upset, but not mad," that the 
fan had accidentally hit the ceiling, and that he had neither attacked nor chased the men. See id. 
at 58, 175 P.3d at 714. Both Fetelee and the witnesses testified that he returned a short time 
later to apologize and appeared calm. See id. at 56, 58,175 P.3d at 712,714. 
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apartment incident did not lead directly to the charges that were the subject of 
the trial. 22 
Fetelee filed a motion in limine to block evidence of his uncharged "bad 
acts," such as the apartment incident.23 Under H.R.E. Rule 404(b), the 
admissibility of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is limited; evidence of the bad 
act is not admissible to prove character, but can be admissible if probative "of 
another fact that is of consequence.,,24 
The trial court denied Fetelee's motion and allowed evidence of the 
apartment incident to be admitted as res gestae,25 or "circumstances which are 
the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act, and which are admissible 
when illustrative of such act.,,26 The trial court explained: 
It's the judgment of the court that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
juror to conclude that within a time period of as short as three minutes before Mr. 
Fetelee's contact with Ms. Lincoln, he was angry and intoxicated ... while 
engaging in assaultive behavior at [the apartment]. Accordingly, [the apartment 
incident] was sufficiently coincident with the alleged offenses as to constitute the 
res gestae of the alleged offenses. Though the incident does not constitute a 
prior bad act, it is noted that its relevance does include an explanation of [Mr. 
Fetelee's] motive, that is, to manifest the anger he continued to experience as a 
result of the incident in [the apartment].27 
Fetelee appealed the trial court's decision on the basis that the common law 
res gestae doctrine did not constitute an exception to Hawai'i's now-codified 
rule of evidence?8 
22 See id. at 55, 175 P.3d at 711. 
23 See id. at 59-60,175 P.3d at 715-16. 
24 H.R.E. Rule 404(b) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
where such evidence is probative of another fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident. In criminal 
cases, the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on 
good cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
25 Literally, "things done." See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). 
26 Fetelee, 117 Haw. at 65,175 P.3d at 721 (quoting Territoryv. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635, 639 
(1953)). 
27 State v. Fetelee, 114 Haw. 151, 154, 157 P.3d 590,593 (App. 2007) (quoting the trial 
court), rev'd, 117 Haw. 53, 175 P.3d 709. 
28 On appeal: 
Fetelee argue[d] that the incident in [the apartment] constituted a prior bad act that [was] 
inadmissible under HRE 404(b) or, alternatively, under Rule 403. Specifically, Fetelee 
arguer d] that since the codification of HRE in 1981, there has been no indication that 
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Fetelee's codification argument was rejected by the Intennediate Court of 
Appeals (ICA)?9 The ICA reasoned that evidence of the apartment incident 
was "necessary to complete the story for the jury" because it was "linked to the 
crimes charged," and "relevant to provide the jury with an explanation as to 
why Fetelee was so angry and agitated.,,30 Citing decisions from a number of 
appellate courts in other jurisdictions, the court concluded: "There is a res 
gestae exception to HRE Rule 404(b). ,,31 
In a detailed opinion spanning thirty-four reported pages, the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court concluded otherwise: "the res gestae doctrine is no longer a 
legitimate independent ground for admissibility of evidence in Hawai'i 
inasmuch as ... it is superseded by the adoption of the HRE.,,32 Thus, the trial 
court and ICAjudgments were vacated.33 
Writing for Justices Levinson, Acoba, and Duffy,34 Chief Justice Moon 
acknowledged that many jurisdictions and commentators continue to support a 
res gestae exception, but emphasized that the H.R.E. is "a singular and 
primary source" of evidentiary rules.3s With this emphasis, F etelee serves as a 
plain example of the Moon Court strictly applying evidentiary rules in the 
criminal context. 
2. Manewa-Strict foundational requirements for evidence concerning 
analyses of illegal drugs 
Fetelee is not the only example of the Moon Court strictly adhering to the 
requirements of evidentiary rules. In a series of cases near the end of Chief 
Justice Moon's tenure, the Moon Court similarly applied strict foundational 
requirements to evidence of test results introduced by the prosecution. This 
series spanned a broad contextual spectrum, ranging from drug cases involving 
the potential for decades-long prison sentences, to speeding cases involving no 
more than a small fine and license suspension. 
Hawai'i courts intended to expand the res gestae doctrine to include an exception to 
wrongs, crimes, or acts encompassed under HRE 404. 
Id. at 157, 157 P.3d at 596. 
29 See id. at 159, 157 P.3d at 598. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 157-59, 157 P.3d at 596-98. 
32 State v. Fetelee, 117 Haw. 53, 81, 175 P.3d 709, 737 (2008). 
33 See id. at 86, 175 P.3d at 742. 
34 Justice Nakayama concurred in Chief Justice Moon's opinion, but wrote "separately to 
emphasize the ongoing importance ofthe res gestae doctrine": "Although Ijoin the majority in 
its holding that the HRE supersedes the res gestae doctrine, I do not believe the common law is 
antiquated." Id. at 90, 175 P.3d at 746 (Nakayama, J., concurring). 
35 Id. at 79, 175 P.3d at 735 (majority opinion) (quoting SEN. STAND. COMM. REp. No. 22-
80, reprinted in 1980 HAw. SEN. J. 1030, 1031) (emphasis added by Moon, C.J.). 
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In the 2007 State v. Manewa decision,36 the court examined foundational 
requirements for evidence on the weight and nature of drugs seized from the 
defendant, Isaac Manewa.37 Manewa appealed his conviction on the basis that 
the trial court abused its discretion by "allow[ing the State's] chemist to opine 
on the weight and identity of the State's drug evidence.,,38 
Manewa argued that although the chemist was qualified as an expert in drug 
analysis and identification, and had personally analyzed the seized substance, 
the chemist had no "personal knowledge that the instruments he used were 
properly calibrated and/or serviced.,,39 Without evidence to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the amount and type of substance seized, Manewa argued 
that his conviction could not stand. 
The ICA rejected Manewa's appeal. Quoting the Hawai'i Supreme Court's 
1996 decision in State v. Wallace,40 the ICA reasoned that the prosecution was 
merely required to satisfy a "foundational prerequisite for the reliability of a test 
result [by] showing that the measuring instrument is in proper working order.',4\ 
Although the prosecution had not produced maintenance records for the 
analytical balance used to weigh the substance, the ICA stated that the 
prosecution "did offer an independent source of reliable evidence that the 
balance was working properly," in the form of testimony from the chemist.42 
The chemist testified that he "personally verified and validated the balance 
monthly, in addition to the semi-annual service by the manufacturer's 
representative.',43 
36 115 Haw. 343,167 P.3d 336 (2007). Not surprisingly, Manewa was not the first Moon 
Court decision involving evidentiary foundation. For example, Manewa includes a discussion 
of State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382,910 P .2d 695 (1996), decided relatively early in ChiefJustice 
Moon's time on the court. 
37 Manewa was convicted by the trial court of promoting a dangerous drug in the first and 
second degree, under H.R.S. section 712-1241(l)(b)(ii)(A) and 1242(1)(b)(i),respectively. See 
Manewa, 115 Haw. at 345, 167 P.3d at 338. 
38 ld. at 349-50, 167 P.3d at 342-43. 
39 State v. Manewa (Manewa leA), No. 27554,2006 WL 3735966, at *3 (Haw. App. Dec. 
20,2006) (unpublished table decision), rev'd, 115 Haw. 343, 167 P.3d 336. 
40 80 Haw. 382, 910 P.2d 695 (1996). Among other issues, Wallace addressed the 
foundational requirements for evidence on the weight of cocaine seized from the defendant. See 
id. at411-12, 910 P.2d at 724-25. In a relatively brief analysis, the court noted that the forensic 
analyst who weighed the cocaine with an analytical balance, and who testified at trial, did not 
have personal knowledge that the balance had been properly calibrated. Thus, "[tJhere being no 
reliable evidence showing that the balance was in proper working order ... the prosecution 
failed to lay a sound factual foundation." ld. at 412,910 P.2d at 725 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
41 Manewa leA, 2006 WL 3735966, at *2 (quoting Wallace, 80 Haw. at 406,910 P.2d at 
719); see also Manewa, 115 Haw. at 350, 167 P.3d at 343. 
42 Manewa leA, 2006 WL 3735966, at *3. 
43 ld. In his appeal, Manewa summarized the ICA's decision: 
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Manewa then appealed the issue to the Hawai'i Supreme Court. The Moon 
Court44 agreed with the ICA that Wallace applied, but vacated Manewa's 
convictions 45 on the basis that the prosecution had not satisfied the foundational 
requirement of showing that the balance was in proper working order: 
[The chemist] was not qualified as an expert in the calibration of the analytical 
balance. [The chemist] used the balance to weigh the evidence although he did 
not know how its mechanism functioned. The balance is an electronic 
instrument. [The chemist] himself did not know how to calibrate the balance or 
how to service it. He indicated that he had never calibrated the balance and that 
he would not be able to service the machines .... 46 
The court ruled the chemist "'lacked the personal knowledge that the balance 
had been correctly calibrated and merely assumed that the manufacturer's 
service representative had done so. ",47 The court also suggested at least one 
seemingly simple solution to this foundational hurdle: the admission of 
"business records of the manufacturer indicating a correct calibration.'048 The 
prosecution, however, "did not offer such records into evidence.',49 
Accordingly, all charges requiring proof of the amount of drugs seized were 
vacated.50 
Applying Wallace, the ICA noted that [the prosecution] did not produce any maintenance 
records, but reasoned that this was not necessary as [the prosecution] had offered an 
independent source of reliable evidence. SDO at 6-7. This source was [the chemist], an 
expert, testifying that he personally verified and validated the balance each month in 
addition to its semi-annual servicing. SDO at 7. This testimony, the ICA held, satisfied 
the proper working order test. Id . ... The leA held that this testimony was not hearsay as 
it was based on [the chemist's] own personal knowledge that the equipment had been 
verified and, thus, was working properly. 
Manewa, 115 Haw. at 351, 167 P.3d at 344 (quoting Manewa's application for writ of 
certiorari) (emphasis in Manewa). 
44 Chief Justice Moon joined a concurring opinion by Justice Levinson, agreeing with the 
majority opinion that "a proper foundation for the weight of the methamphetamine was not 
established." Manewa, 115 Haw. at 359,167 P.3d at 352 (Levinson, J., concurring) (quoting 
majority opinion) (emphasis in Manewa). The concurring opinion was written to explain a 
different rationale for the inapplicability of State v. Schofill, 63 Haw. 77, 621 P.2d 364 (1980), 
on an issue separate from this foundation question. 
45 See Manewa, 115 Haw. at 358, 167 P.3d at 351. Note, however, that Manewa was 
convicted oflesser included charges, where the charged counts only required evidence of the 
type of drug, not the amount. See id. 
46 Id. at 354-55, 167 P.3d at 347-48. 
47 Id. at 355,167 P.3d at 348 (quoting State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382, 412, 910 P.2d 695, 
725 (1996)). 
48 Id. at 355-56, 167 P.3d at 348-49. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 358, 167 P.3d at 351. 
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In contrast, the prosecution had satisfied the foundational requirements for 
reliability of the "GCMS,,51 and "FTIR,,52 instruments used to identify the 
nature of the seized substance (methamphetamine). 53 This was because the 
chemist testified that he conducted a "routine check" "each and every morning" 
on the GCMS, and had been "trained to ensure that the GCMS and FTIR 
instruments were in working order.,,54 Thus, Manewa was convicted oflesser 
included crimes that only required proof of knowing possession of "any 
dangerous drug in any amount.,,55 
3. Assaye, Werle, and Fitzwater-Evidentiary requirements in the driving 
cases 
The court has also addressed essentially the same foundational question in a 
less drastic criminal context-speeding tickets. In the 2009 State v. Assaye 
case,s6 evidence collected by a police officer with a laser gun was used to 
convict Abiye Assaye of speeding. Assaye appealed his conviction to the ICA, 
on the basis that the State had "failed to establish the requisite foundation for 
such evidence. ,,57 In a summary disposition order, the ICA cited two prior 
cases regarding "speed gun" evidence, State v. Tailo58 and State v. Stoa,59 to 
conclude that the "district court did not err in admitting the laser-gun 
reading. ,,60 
On appeal from the ICA, the Moon Court took a more detailed look at the 
issue and distinguished the Tailo and Stoa decisions. In Tailo, the defendant 
had alleged that no foundation was laid to support the accuracy of a "tuning 
fork" test used to calibrate a radar gun.61 The Hawai'i Supreme Court, in 1989, 
noted: "Because of the strength of the scientific principles on which the radar 
gun is based, every recent court which has dealt with the question has taken 
judicial notice of the scientific reliability of radar speedmeters as recorders of 
51 Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer. See id. at 347, 167 P.3d at 340. 
52 Fourier transform infrared spectrometer. See id. 
53 Id. at 354, 167 P.3d at 347. 
54 Id. at 354-55, 167 P.3d at 347-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55 Id. at 359, 167 P.3d at 352 (quoting HAw. REv. STAT. § 712-1243(l)(c)(1993 & Supp. 
2003)) (emphasis added). 
56 121 Haw. 204, 216 P.3d 1227 (2009). 
57 State v. Assaye (Assaye ICA), No. 29078, 2009 WL 81871, at *1 (Haw. App. Jan. 13, 
2009), rev'd, 121 Haw. 204, 216 P.3d 1227. 
58 70 Haw. 580, 779 P.2d 11 (1989). 
59 112 Haw. 260,145 P.3d 803 (App. 2006), overruled by Assaye, 121 Haw. at214, 216 
P.3d at 1237. 
60 Assaye ICA, 2009 WL 81871, at *1. 
61 Assaye, 121 Haw. at 210, 216 P.3d at 1233 (citing Tailo, 70 Haw. at 582, 779 P.2d at 
12). 
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speed.,,62 Thus, the Tailo court concluded that the prosecution "is not required 
to prove the accuracy of the tuning fork" because "[r]equiring proof of the 
accuracy of those testing devices in every case would impose an inordinate 
burden upon" the prosecution.63 
"In Stoa, the ICA extended Tailo' s analysis regarding the accuracy of a radar 
gun to that of a laser gun.,,64 And in addition to taking judicial notice of the 
accuracy oflaser guns, the ICA also held that a police officer's testimony that 
he performed a series of four functionality tests on the laser gun prior to his 
patrol was sufficient to set forth a "sound factual foundation.,,65 
In Assaye, the Moon Court recognized that the officer had apparently 
performed the same four functionality tests as the officer in Stoa.66 However, 
the court reached a starkly different conclusion on the admissibility of the 
evidence: 
[W]e hold that the leA's decision in this case, and by implication the decision in 
Stoa, is obviously inconsistent with the court's decision in Manewa insofar as 
Manewa requires the prosecution to prove that the four tests performed by [the 
officer] were procedures recommended by the manufacturer for the p~ose of 
showing that the particular laser gun was in fact operating properly .... 7 
In addition, the court also held that training must satisfy the same standard; 
the prosecution must prove that the officer's training '''meets the requirements' 
of the manufacturer of the laser gun.,,68 
Assaye's conviction was reversed because the prosecution had not properly 
submitted evidence regarding the manufacturer's recommendations for 
calibration and training: "the trial court abused its discretion by concluding 
that [the officer's] testimony provided a proper foundation for the speed 
reading given by the laser gun.,,69 
Days later, this evidentiary foundation question was addressed in another 
context in State v. Werie,70 regarding evidence of intoxication from a blood 
alcohol test used to support the conviction of William Werle for drunk 
driving.?1 Rather than citing the Manewa line of cases, the court's analysis 
instead began with H.R.E. Rules 702 and 703 (regarding the admissibility of 
62 [d. (quoting Tailo, 70 Haw. at 582,779 P.2d at 13). 
63 [d. at 211, 216 P.3d at 1234 (quoting Tailo, 70 Haw. at 583-84, 779 P.2d at 14). 
64 Id. (citing Stoa, 112 Haw. at 265, 145 P.3d at 808). 
65 Id. at 211-12, 216 P.3d at 1234-35. 
66 Seeid. at212,216P.3dat 1235. 
67 [d. 
68 [d. at 216, 216 P.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). 
69 See id. at 216,216 P.3d at 1239. 
70 121 Haw. 274, 218 P.3d 762 (2009). 
71 See id. at 276, 218 P.3d at 764. More precisely, Werle was convicted of operating a 
vehicle under the influence ofan intoxicant under H.R.S. sections 291E-61(a) and (d). See id. 
2011 / c.J. MOON'S CRIMINAL PAST 765 
scientific or technical evidence).72 But the fundamental concern with reliable 
test methods was the same as in Manewa and Assaye: "As part of the 
foundation, the prosecution must establish the reliability of the test results 
which establish intoxication.,,73 
In Werle, the prosecution submitted testimony from the analyst who tested 
the defendant's blood sample.74 The analyst explained his understanding of the 
scientific principles underlying the testing method, and also testified that 
Werle's blood alcohol level was outside the maximum range of the instrument, 
and thus the sample had to be diluted before testing.75 The prosecution also 
submitted testimony from the Ph.D. biochemist who directed the Department of 
Health-licensed toxicology lab and its quality assurance program.76 
Despite this testimony, the court held that "there was insufficient competent 
testimony in the record to establish the foundational reliability of Werle's blood 
alcohol test results," because "[n]either [the biochemist's] nor [the analyst's] 
testimony established the validity of the scientific principles" underlying the 
testing instrument and technique.77 The court suggested that the biochemist 
"would have been the logical witness to testify as to the validity of the scientific 
72 See id. at 282, 218 P.3d at 770 ("Blood alcohol tests are scientific in nature. In Hawai'i, 
the admissibility of scientific or technical evidence is governed by Hawai'i Rules of Evidence 
(HRE) Rules 702 and 703 (1993)."). Rule 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. In determining the issue of assistance to the trier off act, the court 
may consider the trnstworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of 
analysis employed by the proffered expert. 
HAW. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). Rule 703 states: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The 
court may, however, disallow testimony in the form of an opinion if the underlyingfacts 
or data indicate lack of trnstworthiness. 
HAw. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added); see also Werle, 121 Haw. at 282, 218 P.3dat 770 (stating 
the test for reliability of scientific evidence under H.R.E. Rules 702 and 703: "Whether 
scientific evidence is reliable depends on three factors, the validity of the underlying principle, 
the validity of the technique applying that principle, and the proper application of the technique 
on the partiCUlar occasion." (quoting State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130, 136,828 P.2d 1274, 
1279 (1992))). 
73 Werle, 121 Haw. at 282, 218 P.3d at 770 (citation omitted). 
74 See id. at 278, 218 P.3d at 766. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 279, 218 P.3d at 767. 
77 !d. at 286, 218 P.3d at 774. 
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principles," but he "was not asked to explain [those] principles.,,7s Thus, 
Werle's conviction was reversed.79 
The last in the series of cases identified here, State v. Fitzwater, so was 
decided in 2010 and addressed the foundational requirement in another 
relatively low-tech speeding case. This time, the vehicle's speed was measured 
by the speedometer in an officer's vehicle. Chief Justice Moon joined an 
opinion written by his eventual successor, then-Associate Justice Mark 
Recktenwald, and once again the court departed from the trial court's and 
leA's rulings and vacated the conviction. 
Citing Wallace, Manewa, and Assaye, the court held that the prosecution was 
required to establish the reliability of the officer's speedometer, which had been 
calibrated in a "speed check."Sl For the result of that speed check to be 
admissible, the State was required to establish (1) "how and when the speed 
check was performed, including whether it was performed in the manner 
specified by the manufacturer of the equipment used to perform the check, and 
(2) the identity and qualifications of the person performing the check, including 
whether that person had whatever training the manufacturer recommends in 
order to competently perform it."s2 
Perhaps aiming to comply with Manewa's suggestion that calibration records 
from a manufacturer can lay the required foundation, the prosecution submitted 
a "speed check card" into evidence, to demonstrate that the officer's 
speedometer had been calibrated by an independent shop.s3 The prosecution, 
however, once again relied too heavily on the officer's testimony for this 
evidence. The court held that the officer could not properly authenticate the 
independent shop's speed check card under H.R.E. Rule 803(b)(6).s4 Under 
Rule 803(b)( 6)-the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule-records 
of a regularly conducted activity can be authenticated by a "custodian or other 
qualified witness."s5 However, the officer was not the custodian of the speed 
78 Id. at 285-86,218 P.3d at 773-74. 
79 See id. at 287, 218 P.3d at 775. 
80 122 Haw. 354, 227 P.3d 520 (2010). 
81 See id. at 378, 227 P.3d at 544. 
82 Id. at 376-77, 227 P.3d at 542-43. 
83 See id. at 357, 227 P.3d at 523. 
84 See id. at 365-70, 227 P.3d at 531-36. 
8S See id. at 365, 227 P.3d at 531. H.R.E. Rule 803(b)(6) allows, as an exception to the 
hearsay rule, admission of: 
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made in the 
course of a regularly conducted activity, at or near the time ofthe acts, events, conditions, 
opinions, or diagnoses, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness .... 
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check records, did not have personal knowledge of how the speed checks were 
done, and did not testify about who performed the checks.86 
Thus, the officer was not a "qualified witness" because his testimony did not 
contain the necessary "indicia of reliability" to support authentication by a non-
custodian.87 "As a result, 'inadequate foundation was laid to show' that the 
speed check 'could be relied on as a substantive fact. ",88 
C. Trends and Other Comments on the Evidence Cases 
Together, these selected evidence cases hint at four general trends in the later 
years of the Moon Court. 
First, the cases reflect an increasingly rule~based approach to evidentiary 
questions in the criminal context. This approach is clear in Fetelee, which 
strictly abolished the common law res gestae doctrine in favor of the H.R.E. 
The same trend is also evident, in various ways, in the foundation cases. For 
example, in Fitzwater, the court explained that although the "indicia of 
reliability" test remains relevant with respect to admissibility of business 
records, this common law test does not "supplant" the rules: 
Thus, we hold that when an entity incorporates records prepared by another entity 
into its own records, they are admissible as business records of the incorporating 
entity provided that it relies on the records, there are other indicia of reliability, 
and the requirements of Rule 803(b)( 6) are otherwise satisfied. The requirements 
of(1) reliance and (2) indicia of reliability do not supplant the provisions of the 
rule; rather, we view them as necessary in these circumstances to satisfy the 
rule's requirement that the records were "made in the course of a regularly 
conducted activity" of the incorporating entity. 89 
Similarly, Werle's foundational analysis began with H.R.E. Rules 702 and 703 
as opposed to the common law.90 
Thus, while codification of the rules cannot replace the need for a judiciary 
to apply those rules using appropriate tests, the Moon Court grounded its 
application more firmly in the modem rules than in prior case law. This 
approach may yet sway other jurisdictions. For example, Justices Albin and 
Long of the New Jersey Supreme Court favorably described and quoted the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court's Fetelee decision, leading them to conclude that "[r]es 
86 See Fitzwater, 122 Haw. at 365-66, 369, 227 P.3d at 531-32,535. 
87 Id. at 369, 227 P.3d at 535. 
88 Id. at 377, 227 P.3d at 543 (quoting State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382,412,910 P.2d 695, 
725 (1996)). 
89 Id. at 367-68, 227 P.3d at 533-34 (citing HAw. R. EVID. 803(b)(6» (emphasis added). 
90 See State v. Werle, 121 Haw. 274,282,218 P.3d 762, 770 (2009). 
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gestae is the moldy cardboard box in the basement, whose contents no longer 
have any utility.',9l 
The second trend gleaned from these cases is a strict adherence to evidentiary 
requirements, even in the face of contrary decisions by other courts. For 
example, in Fetelee, the ICA had followed, and cited at length, decisions from 
appellate courts in Washington,92 Michigan,93 South Dakota,94 and Colorado.95 
Each held that the common law res gestae exception survived codification of 
the rules of evidence. The Hawai'i Supreme Court also acknowledged that res 
gestae "has continued to be utilized by other courts as a viable concept ... and 
an exception to Rule 404(b ),,,96 citing decisions by federal courts of appeal in 
the Fifth,97 Sixth,98 Eighth,99 Ninth,100 Tenth, 101 and Eleventh lO2 circuits. 103 
91 State v. Kemp, 948 A.2d 636, 652 (N.J. 2008) (Albin, J., concurring). 
92 See State v. Fetelee, 114 Haw. 151, 158, 157 P.3d 590, 597 (App. 2007) ("The 
[Washington] court concluded that such admission was proper under the res gestae or 'same 
transaction' exception to Rule 404(b)." (citing State v. Elmore, 985 P.2d 289,311 (Wash. 
1999))). "This exception permits the admission of evidence of other crimes or misconduct 
where it is a link in the chain of an unbroken sequence of events surrounding the charged 
offense in order that a complete picture be depicted for the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Acosta, 
98 P.3d 503, 512 (Wash. App. 2004». 
93 See id. ("Michigan courts have defined the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b) as that 
'evidence of prior bad acts [that] is admissible where those acts are so blended or connected 
with the charged offense that proof of one incidentally involves the other or explains the 
circumstances of the crime.'" (quoting People v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Mich. App. 
1983»). 
94 See id. ("[T]he Supreme Court of South Dakota stated that 'evidence of 'other acts' may 
be admissible as res gestae evidence, . . . an exception to [South Dakota Codified Laws 
(SDCL)] 19-12-5 or Federal Rule 404(b).'" (citing State v. Pasek, 691 N.W.2d 301,309 n.7 
(S.D. 2004))). 
95 See id. at 159, 157 P.3d at 598 ("The [Supreme Court of Colorado] further emphasized 
that res gestae evidence is the antithesis of CRE [(Colorado Rules of Evidence)] 904(b) 
evidence. Where CRE 404(b) evidence is independent from the charged offense, res gestae 
evidence is limited to the offense. " (quoting People v. Quintana, 882 P .2d 1366, 1373 n.12 
(Colo. 1994»). 
96 State v. Fetelee, 117 Haw. 53,68, 175 P.3d 709, 724 (2008). 
97 See id. (citing United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978»; see also 
United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823,825 (5th Cir. 1990). 
98 See id. (quoting United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that res gestae evidence "does not implicate Rule 404(b)"». 
99 See id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006». 
100 See id. ("A jury is entitled to know the circumstances and background of a criminal 
charge." (quoting United States v. Daly, 974 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
101 See id. (citing United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822,831 (10th Cir. 1999». 
102 See id. (citing United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (lith Cir. 1983». 
103 See id. at 68-69, 175 P.3d at 724-25 (explaining that the res gestae exception continues to 
be utilized in a number of other jurisdictions, albeit sometimes with different terminology) 
(quoting, for example, Green, 175 F.3d at 831, which noted that "[d]irect or intrinsic evidence 
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However, after a long discussion of various opinions which analyzed the 
viability of the res gestae doctrine, the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided that 
such opinions merely "underscore[] the need" for the court to reach its own 
conclusion. 104 
Likewise, in Assaye, the court sharply curtailed application of the earlier 
Tailo and Stoa decisions, in favor of its more recent Manewa precedent. 
Instead of following Tailo, which permitted judicial notice of the reliability of 
radar speed measurements, or Stoa, in which the ICA logically extended the 
Tailo ruling to laser guns, the Moon Court diligently applied its foundational 
"reliability" requirements from the Manewa drug case. The court relied on the 
principles in Manewa despite the seemingly different factual contexts. Thus, it 
appears that neither prior cases from Hawai'i, nor cases from other 
jurisdictions, could steer the Moon Court from its own evidentiary course. 
The third trend to be teased from these evidence decisions is an apparent 
insistence on the foundational reliability test, even at the expense of an 
arguably more "practical" perspective. For example, in Assaye, the court 
turned away from its prior rationale that "[r]equiring proof ofthe accuracy of 
[speed] testing devices in every case would impose an inordinate burden upon" 
the prosecution. \05 To the Moon Court, this practical burden was apparently 
outweighed by a need to follow the evidentiary rules. 
Similarly, in Fitzwater, the officer testified that he trailed the defendant and 
measured him traveling at twice the thirty-five mile per hour limit. 106 Under 
those circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that a precise calibration was 
necessary to reliably test whether the defendant was speeding. 
In Werle, the prosecution's laboratory analyst testified that he needed to 
dilute the defendant's blood sample, because the alcohol content was above the 
instrument's maximum analytical range. \07 Again, it is questionable whether a 
precisely calibrated instrument was necessary to reliably establish intoxication 
under those facts. 
of the crime does not fall within the ambit of the rule."). The Fetelee court also noted that 
courts from the Seventh Circuit, D.C. Circuit, Kansas, Maryland, Wyoming, Montana, Illinois, 
Maine, and Missouri have concluded, like the Hawai'i Supreme Court, that res gestae is no 
longer a viable doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 67-68, 175 P.3d at 724-25; see also State v. Kemp, 948 
A.2d 636, 652 (N.J. 2008) (Albin, J., concurring). 
104 See Fetelee, 117 Haw. at 78, 175 P.3d at 734 ("The foregoing discussion underscores the 
need for this court to settle the question whether the res gestae doctrine can co-exist with the 
HRE."). 
105 State v. Assaye, 121 Haw. 204, 211, 216 P.3d 1227, 1234 (2009)(quoting State v. railo, 
70 Haw. 580, 583, 779 P.2d II, 14 (1989». 
106 See State v. Fitzwater, 122 Haw. 354, 357, 227 P.3d 520,523 (2010). 
107 See State v. Werle, 121 Haw. 274, 278, 218 P.3d 762, 766 (2009). 
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In Manewa, the relevant statute required evidence that the defendant 
possessed more than one-eighth of an ounce of a dangerous drug.108 Although 
it is unclear from the court's opinion how close the analyst's measurement was 
to this cut-off, laboratory-grade analytical balances are typically far more 
precise than plus/minus several grams. 109 
To summarize this third trend, it appears that in the context of evidentiary 
challenges, the Moon Court forced practical considerations to yield to the 
procedural certainty and protection afforded by rules of evidence. 
The fourth and final trend illustrated by these evidence cases is reflected in 
their authors. The transition from common law to codified rules began with 
Chief Justice Richardson and his successor Chief Justice Lum. Chief Justice 
Moon continued this movement and later penned the Fetelee decision. Current 
Chief Justice Recktenwald authored the Fitzwater opinion, which closely 
followed the Wallace-Manewa-Assaye line. 110 Thus, it appears thatthe court's 
approach to these evidence issues will survive ChiefJustice Moon's retirement, 
at least for now. 
III. SELECT DECISIONS IMPLICATING Pruv ACY CONCERNS IN THE 
CRIMINAL CONTEXT 
A. Background 
In contrast to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's protection 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures,,,llI Hawai'i's corresponding 
108 See State v. Manewa, 115 Haw. 343, 167 P.3d 336 (2007) (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 
712-1242 (1993 & Supp. 2003) (requiring possession of more than one-eighth of an ounce)). 
109 One ofthis article's authors has personal experience with analytical balances and GCIMS 
instruments in the laboratory. From that experience, it is readily apparent that analytical 
balances are routinely used to measure substances with much finer precision (such as 
micrograms-l/IOOO ofa gram--or less) than at issue in Manewa. 
Furthermore, we question the court's differing conclusions on the analytical balance used 
to weigh the seized substance, as opposed to the GCIMS instrument used to identify the nature 
ofthe substance. The court took foundational solace in the fact that the GCIMS instrument was 
calibrated daily, while the balance was calibrated only semi-annually. See id. at 346-47, 167 
P.3d at 353-54. However, a practical explanation for this discrepancy cuts against the court's 
conclusion. In the author's experience, analytical balances tend to be robust, maintaining their 
relative precision even with infrequent calibration. GCIMS instruments, in contrast, are often 
extraordinarily "finicky" and require calibration daily or more frequently. Thus, from a 
practical perspective, it is unlikely that the chemist's frequent calibrations in Manewa are a true 
indication of the GCIMS test's reliability relative to the analytical balance. 
110 Then-Associate Justice Recktenwald recused himself in Werle and Assaye, presumably 
because those cases were appealed to the ICA when he sat on that court. 
III U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
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constitutional provision contains an explicit right to privacy. Article I, section 
7 provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of 
privacy shall not be violated.,,112 
Under the Lum Court, this constitutional right was interpreted to afford, in 
some respects, greater protections 113 for defendants in the criminal context. I 14 
The leading example of enhanced "search and seizure" protections for criminal 
defendants in the final years ofthe Lum Court was State v. Quino, in which the 
Lum Court ruled that the Honolulu Police Department's use of the "walk and 
talk" drug interdiction method at the Honolulu International Airport violated an 
individual's "right to be secure against unreasonable seizures guaranteed by 
article I, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. ,,115 The court, of which then-
Associate Justice Moon was a part, expressly granted defendants greater 
protections against search and seizure than those afforded under federal law. 116 
After Quino, an officer's deliberate and investigative questioning constitutes a 
seizure that requires an "objective basis for suspecting them of misconduct" 
(i.e., reasonable suspicion), or the individual's consent. ll7 With this ruling, 
Hawai'i became one of the few states to lower the threshold for when 
questioning effects a "seizure" on the basis of state law. 118 
Jd. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
II2 HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
113 See Van Dyke et a\., supra note 1; Kawatachi, supra note 1. 
114 Because this article focuses on the Moon Court's criminal law jurisprudence, we do not 
discuss the Hawai'i Constitution's second clause bestowing a more general right to privacy 
outside of the criminal context. Article I, section 6 provides that "[t]he right of the people to 
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest." HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This provision has been the basis for a number of important 
decisions by the Moon Court regarding constitutional protection for activities that are "implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty." E.g., State v. MalIan, 86 Haw. 440, 950 P .2d 178 (1998) 
(holding that "the right to possess and use marijuana cannot be considered a 'fundamental' right 
that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" and that "smoking marijuana is [not] a part of 
the 'traditions and collective conscience of our people"'); see also Julia B.L. Worsham, Note, 
Privacy Outside of the Penumbra: A Discussion of Hawai 'i 's Right to Privacy After State v. 
MalIan, 21 U. HAw. L. REv. 273 (1999). 
liS 74 Haw. 161, 175, 840 P .2d 358, 365 (1992). 
116 See id. at 170, 840 P .2d at 362. 
117 See jd. at 175,840 P.2d at 365. 
118 See Toby M. Tonaki et aI., Comment, State v. Quino, The Hawai 'j Supreme Court Pulls 
Out All the "Stops ", 15 U. HAw. L. REv. 289, 336 n.394 (1993); Gail Ezra Cary, Warrantless 
Seizures, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 1188,1188-89 (1994). 
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The selected cases below demonstrate the Moon Court's willingness to 
continue this trend, but not without exception. 
B. Case Summaries 
1. Kearns and Trainor-"Walk and talk" after Quino 
Less than two years after Quino was decided, in 1994, the relatively new 
Moon Court had occasion to reaffirm the Quino ruling and clarify the 
"consensual encounter" justification for a seizure in State v. Kearns. 119 As in 
Quino, the police officers in Kearns "seized" the defendant during the course 
of an investigative "walk and talk" encounter at the airport,120 and "given the 
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
or she was not free to leave.,,121 The court rejected the State's argument that 
the seizure was permissible because Kearns had consented to it. 122 Instead, the 
court held that "mere acquiescence to questioning" is "insufficient to establish 
consent" during a walk and talk investigation.123 In order for a walk and talk 
encounter to be constitutionally upheld as "consensual," the defendant must 
have been informed of his or her "right to decline to participate in the encounter 
and ... leave at any time" and must have voluntarily participated. 124 Because 
Keams had not been so informed and could not have consented, the court ruled 
that the evidence obtained after the seizure should have been suppressed, and 
the conviction was vacated. 125 Kearns received national attention for its 
imposition of a more rigorous "consent" standard.126 
Two years after Kearns, the Moon Court addressed the "reasonable 
suspicion" exception to the warrant requirement. 127 In State v. Trainor, the 
officer initiated a walk and talk encounter with the defendant based on 
purportedly "objective reasons," including Trainor's baggy clothing, lack of 
119 75 Haw. 558, 867 P.2d 903 (1994). Chief Justice Moon was recused from this case. 
120 See id. at 564, 867 P.2d at 905. 
121 See id. at 566,867 P.2d at 907. 
122 See id. at 569-72, 867 P.2d at 908-9. 
123 Id. at 571,867 P.2d at 909. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 572,867 P.2d at 910. 
126 See Robert 1. Burnett, Comment, Random Police-Citizen Encounters: When is a Seizure 
a Seizure?, 33 DUQ. L. REv. 283 (1995); Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following 
Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 
28 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 1,56-60 (2001). 
127 See State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 925 P.2d 818 (1996). Chief Justice Moon was 
recused from this case. 
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check-on baggage, "flushed and shiny" complexion, and harried demeanor. 128 
These characteristics, however, were too broad to create a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.129 The court noted that "[i]t is precisely because article I, 
section 7 ... was designed, among other things, to safeguard [against] ... 
arbitrary, oppressive, and harassing conduct by the police that we have 
conditioned an investigative stop on the police officer's capacity to point to 
specific and articulable facts ... that criminal activity is afoot.,,130 Without 
such specific and articulable facts, the officer "was unjustified in initiating an 
investigative 'encounter' with Trainor.,,131 
2. Lopez and Cuntapay-Privacy in the home 
A similar concern for the individual's right to privacy can be seen in the 
Moon Court's jurisprudence relating to searches of the home. For instance, 
early in the Moon Court's tenure, the court reaffirmed its commitment to an 
"actual authority" consent requirement when it ruled in State v. Lopez l32 that 
one must have actual authority to consent to the search of another person's 
home in order for the search to be constitutional. 133 In Lopez, the Moon Court 
expressly declined to adopt the federal concept of "apparent authority.,,134 
Thus, when the mother of a defendant granted the investigating officer 
permission to enter the defendant's home without having first received 
permission from the defendant to do so, the court ruled the nonconsensual 
search unconstitutional under article I, section 7. 135 Citing to Quino, the court 
noted that it was "free to provide broader protection under [the] state 
constitution" than the u.s. Constitution provides and that "[i]n the area of 
searches and seizures under article I, section 7, [it had] often exercised this 
freedom. ,,136 
128 See id. at 252,925 P.2d at 820. 
129 See id. at 257-58,925 P.2d at 825-26. 
\30 Id. at 259,925 P.2d at 827 (quoting State v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161, 178-80,840 P.2d 358, 
366 (1992) (Levinson, l, concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
13l Id. 
J32 78 Haw. 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995). 
133 See id. at 445,896 P.2d at 901. 
134 See id. (stating that although "the concept of apparent authority is well-recognized on the 
federal level, this court has always required a showing of 'actual authority'''). 
\35 See id. at 447, 896 P.2d at 903. 
136 Id. at 445, 896 P .2d at 901; see also State v. Detroy, 102 Haw. 13, 22, 72 P .3d 485, 494 
(2003) (citing Lopez with approval). The court did, however, adopt the "inevitable discovery 
exception" with respect to tangible physical evidence, allowing the prosecution to "present clear 
and convincing evidence that any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7, would 
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means." Lopez, 78 Haw. at 451, 896 P .2d at 907. 
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Later, in State v. Cuntapay,137 the court similarly departed from federal 
precedent in its approach to a guest's right to privacy in the host's home. 138 
Whereas the u.s. Supreme Court recognized an overnight guest's Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy, the Moon Court declined to so limit the scope of a 
guest's rights, ruling that a guest "should share his [or her] host's shelter 
against unreasonable searches and seizures" under article I, section 7 of the 
Hawai'i Constitution.139 The court concluded that evidence of drug 
paraphernalia belonging to the house guest was properly suppressed on the 
basis that the guest shared a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's 
garage and was protected from the warrantless, nonconsensual search of the 
premises. 140 Justice Nakayama and Chief Justice Moon dissented, not on 
constitutional principles, but on the basis that the defendant had failed to 
establish that he held the status of a house guest. 141 
3. Heapy, Spillner, and Estabillio---Privacy on the road 
More recently, the Moon Court revisited these privacy concerns in the 
context of investigatory traffic stops. Under State v. Heapy,142 an officer cannot 
establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop solely on the basis that 
the driver turned to avoid a sobriety checkpoint. 143 The officer had effected the 
traffic stop based on the officer's prior experience that "in every case" in which 
a driver avoids a checkpoint, the driver was violating the law in some other 
way.l44 The majority opinion concluded that when a driver engages in no 
suspicious acts other than making a lawful turn away from the checkpoint, there 
is no '''reasonable suspicion' that the person stopped was engaged in criminal 
conduct" to warrant a stop under article I, section 7. 145 Accordingly, the court 
declined to expand the reasonable suspicion standard to include an officer's 
generalized knowledge of criminal behavior. 146 Chief Justice Moon dissented, 
suggesting instead that an otherwise legal turn off the road might create 
reasonable suspicion considering the totality of the circumstances. 147 
137 104 Haw. 109,85 P.3d 634 (2004). 
138 See id. at 110, 85 P.3d at 635. 
139 See id. at 116, 85 P.3d at 641 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting». 
140 See id. at 116-18, 85 P.3d at 641-42. 
141 Id. at 119,85 P.3d at 644 (Nakayama, J., dissenting). 
142 113 Haw. 283, 151 P.3d 764 (2007). 
143 See id. at 285, 151 P.3d at 766. 
144 Id. at 288, 151 P.3d at 769. 
145 Id. at 290,292,299, 151 P.3d at 771, 773, 780. 
146 Id. at 295-96, 151 P.3d at 776-77. 
147 See id. at 308, 151 P.3d at 789 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Moon also 
emphasized the State's interest in protecting the safety of the public. See id. at 306,151 P.3d at 
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The same year Heapy was issued, the court did expand the ~'reasonable 
suspicion" standard to permit an officer to rely on "knowledge of a suspected 
ongoing law violation engaged in by the individual in question" when effecting 
a traffic stop.148 In State v. Spillner, the officer who stopped the defendant's 
car learned one week earlier that the defendant's truck had no valid insurance 
and learned two weeks earlier that the defendant had no valid license. 149 The 
Moon Court ruled that this knowledge of prior violations was enough to 
provide reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity the third time the 
officer stopped the same defendant, even without any obvious signs of criminal 
activity before the third stop.150 This time, Justice Acoba, who authored the 
majority opinion in Heapy, dissented, arguing that the officer did not have 
"specific and articulable facts" that the defendant was driving a vehicle without 
a license at the time the stop was made. lSI 
In 2009, Chief Justice Moon offered an overview of the court's "case law 
regarding investigatory detentions" in the course of his opinion in State v. 
Estabillio. IS2 In this case, an officer's reasonable suspicion that a defendant 
was speeding did not constitute reasonable suspicion of drug dealing. IS3 The 
officers stopped the defendant for a traffic offense and eventually discovered 
drugs in the vehicle.154 The Moon Court agreed with Estabillio that 
investigative detention and questioning must be related to the scope of the 
original detention, which in this case was unrelated to drug paraphernalia.155 
Relying in part on the walk and talk line of cases regarding "inquisitive 
questioning," the court ruled that the officer's "drug investigation constituted a 
seizure separate and distinct from the traffic investigation" and was 
unconstitutional under article I, section 7 because it was unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion. 156 
787. See also Jacob Matson, Note, Drunk, Driving, and Untouchable: The Implications of 
State v. Heapy on Reasonable Suspicion in Hawai'i, 31 U. HAW. L. REv. 607 (2009). 
148 See State v. Spillner, 116 Haw. 351, 360, 173 P.3d 498,507 (2007). 
149 See id. at 363, 173 P.3d at 510. 
150 See id. at 355,364, 173 P.3d at 502,511. 
151 See id. at 365,173 P.3d at 512 (Acoba, J., dissenting). See also AlanaPeacott-Ricardos, 
Note, State v. Spillner: An Investigatory Stop Based on Unreasonable Suspicion, 31 U. HAw. 
L. REv. 631 (2009) (arguing that Spillner was incorrectly decided). 
152 121 Haw. 261, 269-70, 218 P.3d 749, 757-58 (2009). Then-Associate Justice 
Recktenwald was recused from this case. 
153 Id. at 273,218 P.3d at 761. 
154 See id. at 262-63, 218 P.3d at 750-51. 
155 Id. at 272, 218 P.3d at 760. 
156 Id. at 274,218 P.3d at 762. 
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4. Jane Doe and John Doe-Privacy at school 
There is a distinct line of cases implicating privacy rights in the school 
setting. Early in his tenure as chief justice, Moon authored an opinion 
expressly declining to bestow broader protection to school children under 
article I, section 7 than would otherwise be awarded by the Fourth 
Amendment. 157 In upholding the family court's denial of a high school 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence ofmarijuana uncovered after a search 
of her purse, the Moon Court ruled in In re Jane Doe that "public school 
officials do not need search warrants or probable cause to search or seize 
evidence from students under their authority" so long as the search is 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference. ,,158 Recognizing the school's need to maintain order in a learning 
environment, the court "perceive[ d] no sound or logical reason to afford our 
public school students greater constitutional protections than that afforded by 
the federal constitution. ,,159 
The Moon Court returned to privacy questions in the school context ten years 
later in In re John Doe. 160 Here, school officials had no basis for suspecting the 
high school student of possessing and selling marijuana other than an 
anonymous tip from Crime Stoppers. 161 The court ruled that the tip failed to 
provide either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the search. 162 
The tip "bore no indicia of reliability" because the school officials knew 
nothing about the circumstances under which the tip was provided or the basis 
of the informant's knowledge. 163 Accordingly, the court affirmed the family 
court's order suppressing the seized evidence. 164 This case did not, however, 
alter the earlier In re Jane Doe ruling, and the court did not broaden privacy 
protections under article I, section 7 for the general student population. 
C. Trends and Other Comments on the Privacy Cases 
The principles expounded in the walk and talk cases appear to have shaped 
. the Moon Court's protection of a defendant's right to privacy even beyond the 
walk and talk encounter. The broader concern for individual privacy rights 
157 In re Jane Doe, 77 Haw. 435, 887 P.2d 645 (1994). 
158 Id. at 437,887 P.2d at 647. 
159 Id. at 440, 887 P.2d at 650. 
160 104 Haw. 403, 91 P.3d 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds by In re Jane Doe, 105 
Haw. 505, 100 P.3d 75 (2004). 
161 See id. at 404-05,91 P.3d at 486-87. 
162 See id. at 408, 91 P.3d at 490. 
163 Id. at 411,91 P.3d at 493. 
164 Id. at 404,91 P.3d at 486. 
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expressed in Quino, Keams, and Trainor is mirrored in the Lopez ruling on 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and in the Estabillio ruling 
regarding investigatory stops. Lopez, which was decided in 1995, and 
Estabillio, which was decided in 2009, essentially bookend the Moon Court's 
tenure and reflect a consistent adherence to the trend begun in the Lum Court. 
This trend is not without exception. Because Spillner permitted an officer's 
own knowledge about the defendant's prior traffic violations to create 
reasonable suspicion, it is difficult to reconcile Spillner with Heapy's ruling 
that an officer may not use his or her own knowledge of checkpoint avoidance 
behavior to effect a traffic stop. Neither Heapy nor Spillner involved any 
immediate, overt justification for the stop. The explanation for these seemingly 
disparate rulings may lie in the facts. Unlike in Heapy, the officer in Spil/ner 
had prior contact with the specific defendant and had reason to suspect ongoing 
violations. The traditionally "objective" nature of reasonable suspicion, as 
reflected in Heapy and Justice Acoba's Spillner dissent, suggests that the 
Spillner ruling should be limited to its unusual facts. 
In In re Jane Doe, the court expressly declined to extend to students the 
broader privacy protections that it had extended to defendants in other contexts. 
The court did, however, take special care to limit its ruling to the school context 
and has not used its school cases to limit privacy rights in other circumstances. 
These school cases may not be so much a repudiation of the privacy principles 
from the walk and talk cases as a carefully carved out exception to the broader 
philosophy of the Moon Court with respect to privacy rights. 
Regarding the walk and talk cases specifically, the heightened standard under 
state law has obvious consequences for state versus federal drug enforcement 
efforts. Indeed, the Hawai' i State Legislature has acknowledged as much. In 
2004, the Legislature released its Final Report on Ice and Drug Abatement. 165 
The Joint House-Senate Task Force concluded that the "majority of the Task 
Force does not recommend a constitutional amendment to permit 'walk and 
talk' at this time.,,166 In response to requests from state law enforcement 
officers to be able to "prosecute drug offenders under the same standards as 
federal prosecutors,,,167 the Task Force declined, and noted the ability offederal 
agents to conduct the walk and talk encounters. 168 
The Legislature's approach effectively shifts the primary responsibility for 
drug interdiction efforts from state courts to federal courts. And, the chance 
that a defendant may wind up in federal court instead of state court for these 
165 JOINT HOUSE-SENATE TASK FORCE, FINAL REpORT OF mE JOINT HOUSE-SENATE TASK 
FORCE ON ICE AND DRUG ABATEMENT, 22nd. Leg, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2004), available at 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2004I1istsiice _ finalrpt.pdf 
166 Id. at 7. 
167 Id. at 48. 
168 See id. at 7, 52. 
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offenses serves as a reminder that enhanced rights under article I, section 7 of 
the Hawai'i Constitution does not equate to a free pass under the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These decisions, selected from Hawai'i's criminal law jurisprudence 
concerning privacy rights and evidence rules, illustrate a certain freedom and 
willingness by the Moon Court to forge its own judicial path when applying 
legislative and constitutional mandates. This appears to be true even if the 
results were contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions, and where they were 
perhaps less popular with segments of the legal and law enforcement 
communities. 
In his final State of the Judiciary address, Chief Justice Moon reflected on 
this freedom, extolling the importance of judicial independence and the court's 
ability to rule according to its reasoned judgment, without fear of reprisal-
what he described as "decisional independence.,,)69 It remains to be seen 
exactly how the new Recktenwald Court will exercise its own decisional 
independence. 
169 See Ronald T.Y. Moon, Chief Justice, Haw. Sup. Ct., State of the JudiCiary Address (Jan. 
27, 2010), http://www.courts.state.hi.us/news_andJeports/featured_news/2010/011 
state_oUhejudiciary_2010.htmL 
